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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendants Rasmussen, Griswold, William C. Card, William 
Lane Card, and Architectural Specialties, Inc. have appealed the 
summary judgment by the Fourth Circuit Court, Provo Department. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a final 
judgment of the Circuit Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(d) (1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue I. Whether, based on the undisputed material 
facts, Plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
against Defendant Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc. 
Issue II. Whether, based on the undisputed material 
facts, Plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law that 
the corporate veil of Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc., should be 
pierced. 
Issue III. Whether, upon piercing of the corporate veil 
of Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc. and based on the undisputed 
material facts, the individually named Defendants should be held 
liable as a matter of law. 
Standard of Review for Issues I. II, and III; On 
reviewing a summary judgment, an appellant court applies the same 
standard as that applied by the trial court. Durham v. Marcretts, 
571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (1977). The appellant court considers the 
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evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party, and 
affirms only were it appears there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material issues of fact, or where, even according to the 
facts as contended by the losing party, the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Briggs v. Holcomb. 740 
P.2d 281 (Utah App. 1987). Since summary judgment is granted as 
a matter of law rather than fact, the trial court's legal 
conclusions are reviewed for correctness. Hunt v. ESI 
Engineering, Inc., 808 P.2d 1137 (Utah App. 1991). 
Determinative Statutory Provisions 
The only determinative statutory provision is Rule 56 (c) 
which states as follows: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Defendants William C. Card, William Lane Card, 
Architectural Specialties, Inc., Ray Rasmussen, and William 
Griswold, appeal a summary judgment holding them liable for 
damages, attorney's fees and interest incurred by Architectural 
Sheet Metal, Inc., as a result of services and goods provided to 
Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
The course of the proceedings and disposition of the case 
are accurately set forth in Defendants Card and Architectural 
Specialties, Inc.'s brief on pages 5 and 6, with the following 
exceptions and additions: 
On July 11, 1989, a default certificate was entered 
against Ray Rasmussen by the clerk of the court. (R. 60, Add.A) 
Architectural Sheet Metal was never discharged in 
bankruptcy. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that 
Architectural Sheet Metal was discharged in bankruptcy, nor was 
that issue ever raised by any of the Defendants in response to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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Statement of Facts 
Plaintiff supplied labor and materials to Defendant 
Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc. on and between August 14, 1986, 
and March 12, 1987, in the amount of $13,855.74. (R. 101 Exhibit 
9, Add. B). Despite demand by Plaintiff for payment, Defendant 
Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc., failed to pay the sums owed to 
Plaintiff. (R. 101 Exhibit 9 Add. B). Plaintiff's invoices 
provided for a reasonable attorney's fees for collection on 
accounts and for interest on any outstanding accounts at the rate 
of 1.5% per month or 18% per annum. (R. 101 Exhibit 9, Add. B) . 
Defendant Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc. (hereinafter 
referred to as "ASMI") is a Utah Corporation, incorporated on 
June 16, 1986. (R. 101 Exhibit 1, Add. C) . ASMI's stock is held 
by Architectural Specialties, Inc. (510 shares), Ray Rasmussen 
(245 shares) , and William L. Griswold (245 shares) . (R. 101 
Exhibit 2, Add. D). Todd Jason Wheeler, Raymond T. Rasmussen, 
and William C. Card were the incorporators and the initial 
directors of ASMI. (R. 101 Exhibit 1, Add. C). Ray Rasmussen, 
William C. Card and William L. Card were the officers of ASMI. 
(R. 101 Exhibit 13, Add. E). 
Prior to incorporating, ASMI did business under the name 
of Precision Sheet Metal. (R. 101 Exhibit 12, Add. F) . 
Precision Sheet Metal was a partnership between William C. Card 
and Todd Wheeler. (R. 163, Add. G) . Defendant ASMI and 
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Architectural Specialties Inc. shared the same office location 
at 350 South 400 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 161, Add. G). 
Architectural Specialties Inc. paid over $50,000.00 to ASMI in 
the form of loans or payment of ASMIfs payroll and expenses. (R. 
101 Exhibit 3, Add. H). Plaintifffs invoices received by ASMI 
were stamped as received by Architectural Specialties, Inc. (R. 
101 Exhibit 4, Add. I). Officers of ASMI signed invoices 
addressed to Architectural Specialties, Inc. (R. 101 Exhibit 5, 
Add. J). Reynolds Metals Company sent an invoice to Defendants 
addressed to the following: Architectural Specialties, Inc. dba 
Architectural S/M 350 South 400 East, Suite 302, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111. (R. 101 Exhibit 6, Add. K) . Architectural 
Specialties was billed for supplies used by ASMI on several job 
sites. (R. 101 Exhibits 5, 6, and 7, Add. J, K, L). 
Defendant William C. Card made personal loans to ASMI. 
(R. 101 Exhibit 8, Add. M) . William C. Card and William Lane 
Card were signators on ASMI's checking account and wrote out 
checks on ASMI's behalf. (R. 101 Exhibit 15, Add. N). 
ASMI had a contract for and did work on a project 
entitled Foothill Village. Materials for the Foothill Village 
project were billed and shipped to Architectural Specialties, 
Inc. (R. 101 Exhibits 17 and 18, Add. 0, P) . Architectural 
Specialties, Inc. secured and paid for insurance for ASMI on the 
Foothill Village project. (R. 101 Exhibit 19, Add. Q). 
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Plaintifffs reasonable attorneyfs fees in regard to this matter, 
prior to the appeal, are $2,531.25. (R. 101 Exhibit 11, Add. R) . 
In addition to the foregoing facts, Plaintiff asserted 
a number of other facts in Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and documented those facts in Exhibits set forth in the 
record at R. 101. However, the additional facts asserted by 
Plaintiffs were disputed by Defendants. Plaintiff has included 
in the statement of facts only those facts that were not disputed 
by Defendants in response to Plaintiff's Motion. The affidavits 
filed by the Defendants failed to dispute the facts set forth in 
this section and documented as indicated in the record. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The summary judgment against Architectural Sheet Metal, 
Inc. should be upheld because none of the defendants herein 
disputed the principal amount owed by ASMI to Plaintiff. 
Additionally, the defendants did not contest the amount of 
attorney's fees or interest owed by Defendant ASMI to the 
Plaintiff. Since there are no disputed material facts, judgment 
against Defendant ASMI as a matter of law was proper. 
The trial court's decision to pierce the corporate veil 
and hold the individual defendants liable should be upheld 
because the undisputed facts, even when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the Defendants, do not create any genuine issue as 
to the material facts involved in setting aside the corporation 
and Plaintiff is entitled to have the corporate veil pierced as 
a matter of law. Summary judgment is not precluded when some 
facts are in dispute. It is only precluded when material facts 
are genuinely controverted. In this case, when only viewing 
those facts not properly disputed by the defendants, plaintiff 
is entitled as a matter of law to a judgment setting aside the 
corporate veil. 
The law provides that when the corporate veil is pierced 
shareholders, officers, and directors may be held individually 
liable for the acts of the corporation. Each of the defendants 
in this case was either a shareholder, officer, or director and 
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should be held individually liable. The trial courtfs decision 
finding the defendants liable should be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST ASMI SHOULD 
BE UPHELD IN THAT NONE OF THE DEFENDANTS 
CONTESTED ANY OF THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST ASMI. 
Rule 56 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that summary judgment should be granted in favor of the moving 
party if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law," The lack of genuine issue as to any material fact in 
the present action as to defendant ASMI is evidenced by the facts 
established by the affidavit of Leslie R. Southam. (R. 101 
Exhibit 9, Add. B). 
A. Defendants have not disputed the principal amounts 
owed to Plaintiff by ASMI as a result of goods 
delivered to ASMI by Plaintiff. 
Defendant ASMI accepted goods and materials in the sum 
of $13,855.74 which it refused to pay for despite the fact that 
demand was made. (R. 101 Exhibit 9, Add. B) . In Plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment, plaintiff detailed all the necessary 
elements to prevail against ASMI. Leslie R. Southam, in his 
affidavit attached to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, 
stated that the plaintiff provided labor and materials to 
defendant ASMI in the amount of $13,855.74 on and between August 
14, 1986 and March 12, 1987. Defendant ASMI was billed for that 
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amount but did not pay plaintiff. (R. 101 Exhibit 9, Add, B). 
A review of the affidavits submitted by the defendants 
shows that none of them disputed plaintiff fs claim that it 
provided goods and materials in the amount of $13,855.74. (R. 
163, R. 142, R. 65, R. 156, R. 145, Add. G, S, T, U, and V). 
Since there is nothing in the record controverting 
plaintiff's claim which was verified and proved by the affidavit 
of Leslie R. Southam, plaintiff is entitled to judgment against 
ASMI for the full amount of $13,855.74. 
B. DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT DISPUTED THAT ASMI OWED 
PLAINTIFF FOR INTEREST AND ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT 
TO WRITTEN CONTRACT. 
In its complaint and motion for summary judgment, 
plaintiff requested attorney's fees and interest. No findings 
of fact were entered in connection with the entry of the judgment 
in this matter. This is because findings of fact are unnecessary 
in connection with summary judgment decisions in that the 
resolution is based on undisputed facts and is not one involving 
resolution by the trial court of conflicting testimony. (Taylor 
v. Estate of Taylor. 770 P.2d 163, 168 (Utah App. 1989). 
Because there are no findings of fact, the legal basis for an 
award of fees and interest is complicated by the fact that the 
exact legal basis that the court had in mind in awarding fees 
does not appear in the court's judgment. However, it is 
appropriate to affirm if the trial court's decision can be 
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sustained on any proper legal basis Id. at 169. 
Section 70A-2-207, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 
states as follows: 
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance 
or a written confirmation which is sent within a 
reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it 
states terms additional to or different from those 
offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly 
made conditional on assent to the additional or different 
terms. 
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as 
proposals for addition to the contract. Between 
merchants such terms become part of the contract unless: 
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the 
terms of the offer; 
(b) they materially alter it; or 
(c) notification of objection to them has already 
been given or is given within a reasonable time 
after notice of them is received. 
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the 
existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a 
contract for sale although the writings of the parties 
do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the 
terms of the particular contract consist of those terms 
on which the writings of the parties agree, together with 
any supplementary terms incorporated under any other 
provisions of this act. 
Plaintiff provided defendant ASMI with periodic billing 
statements that included provisions regarding payment of 
collection costs, legal expenses, reasonable attorney's fees, and 
interest at the rate of 1.5% per month. Defendant ASMI did not 
give plaintiff any notice that it objected to these terms, nor 
was the agreement between the parties conditioned upon acceptance 
of the additional terms. Also, these terms did not materially 
alter the agreement between the parties. 
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Therefore, pursuant to 70A-2-207, the provisions 
regarding attorneyfs fees and interest became part of the 
contract between plaintiff and defendant ASMI. The defendants 
have asserted, both in their brief and in their affidavits in 
response to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, that they 
are not personally liable for the interest or attorney's fees 
because they did not sign the invoices. However, none of the 
defendants have disputed the fact that ASMI is liable because of 
the additional language on the invoices. 
In order for attorney's fees to be awarded to a 
prevailing party on summary judgment, the undisputed material 
facts must establish, as a matter of law, that (1) the party is 
entitled to the award, and (2) the amount awarded is reasonable. 
Taylor, 770 P.2d at 169. The invoices provide the legal basis 
for awarding the attorneys fees. The affidavit of Ray M. 
Harding, Jr., (R. 101 Exhibit 11, Add. R) sets forth the amount 
of attorney's fees incurred and indicates that said fees are 
reasonable. The defendants have not disputed that those fees are 
reasonable. A review of the fees requested, the amount of time 
spent, and the hourly rate, shows that said fees are reasonable. 
Since there are no disputed facts with regard to the 
terms of the invoice nor the reasonableness of the attorney's 
fees claimed, the trial court's decision awarding attorney's fees 
and interest to the plaintiff against ASMI should be upheld. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO 
PIERCE THE CORPORATE VEIL OF ASMI 
WAS PROPER AND SHOULD BE UPHELD 
Under Utah law, in order to disregard the corporate 
entity, there must be a concurrence of two circumstances: (1) 
there must be such unity of interest and ownership that the 
separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no 
longer exist, that is, the corporation is, in fact, the alter ego 
of one or a few individuals; and (2) the observance of the 
corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an 
inequitable result would follow. Norman v. First Thrift and Loan 
Co. , 596 P.2d 1028 (1979). The first prong is often termed the 
"formalities requirement." The second prong may be termed the 
"fairness requirement." Factors which are deemed significant in 
determining whether the test has been met include, among others, 
the following: (1) Undercapitalization; (2) failure to observe 
corporate formalities; (3) absence of corporate records; (4) the 
use of the corporation as a facade for operation of the dominate 
stockholder or stockholders; and (5) the use of the corporate 
entity in promoting injustice or fraud. Colman v. Colman, 743 
P.2d 782 (Utah App. 1987). 
The rationale used by courts in permitting the corporate 
veil to be pierced is that if a principal shareholder or owner 
conducts his private and corporate business on an interchangeable 
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or joint basis as if they were one, he is without standing to 
complain when an injured party does the same. Id. at 786. The 
Defendants in this action conducted their business as a joint 
enterprise# and therefore, pursuant to Utah Law, are without 
standing to assert that the corporate veil should not be pierced. 
The following facts show that the trial court properly entered 
summary judgment setting aside the corporate shell in finding the 
defendants liable in this matter. 
A. ASMI FAILED TO OBSERVE CORPORATE FORMALITIES 
In response to plaintiff's request for production of 
documents, ASMI provided plaintiff's attorney with all of ASMI's 
documents. There were no records of any minutes from an 
organizational meeting, no record to show that the corporation 
had either annual meetings or had passed annual resolutions 
adopting the actions of the officers and directors, and there 
were no by-laws. None of the defendants have disputed 
plaintiff's claim regarding ASMI's failure to follow the 
corporate formalities except for Ray Rasmussen. Ray Rasmussen, 
in his affidavit, stated that, upon information and belief, he 
believes that the by-laws and papers pertaining to the 
incorporation meeting were prepared by Spafford and Spafford. 
(R. 162, Add. G). Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 56 (e), 
an affidavit on information and belief is insufficient to provoke 
a genuine issue of fact. Treloqgan v. Treloqgan, 699 P.2d 747, 
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748 (Utah 1985). Mr. Rasmussen's allegations upon information 
and belief that by-laws were adopted is insufficient. 
Additionally, once the plaintiff has, by affidavit, established 
a fact, such as the fact that defendant has failed to observe 
corporate formalities by not keeping minutes or passing by-laws, 
it is the defendant's burden to show that there are specific 
material facts which preclude a grant of summary judgment. See 
Hunt v. ESI Engineering, Inc., 808 P.2d 1137, 1139 (Utah App. 
1991). More than adequate time passed between the filing of 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment alleging that the 
defendants had failed to comply with corporate formalities and 
the hearing on this matter for defendants to produce the 
corporate records if they existed. The defendants' bare 
contentions, unsupported by any specification of any facts in 
support thereof, does not raise a material question of fact which 
would preclude the entry of summary judgment. Massey v. Utah 
Power and Light, 609 P.2d 937 (Utah 1980). 
In addition to the failure to maintain corporate minutes 
or adequate corporate records, the defendants disregarded legal 
formalities and failed to maintain proper arms-length 
relationships between the related entities. ASMI and 
Architectural Specialties operated out of the same location. (R. 
161, Add. G) . Officers of ASMI would sign invoices for 
Architectural Specialties and, conversely, invoices for ASMI were 
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stamped as received by Architectural Specialties Inc. (R. 101 
Exhibits 4 and 5, Add. I and J). 
B. ASMI WAS GROSSLY UNDERCAPITALIZED 
Throughout its existence, ASMI did not have adequate 
capitalization to meet its operating expenses. On numerous 
occasions, Architectural Specialties Inc. paid for ASMI's payroll 
and other operating expenses. Additionally, Architectural 
Specialties Inc. made outright loans to ASMI. There is no 
evidence that Architectural Specialties, Inc., took any action 
to collect or require repayment of those loans. 
The two corporations1 records show loans from ASI to ASMI 
of $5,000.00 on July 16, 1986, only one month after 
incorporation. (R. 101 Exhibit 3 page 1, Add. H). There were 
subsequent loans of $5,000.00 on August 1, 1986 and August 11, 
1986. (R. 101 Exhibit 3 pages 2-5, Add. H) . On September 5, 
1986, there was a loan in the amount of $22,447.27. (R. 101 
Exhibit 3 page 6, Add. H). Architectural Specialties Inc. loaned 
ASMI another $6,301.36 on September 5, 1987. (R. 101 Exhibit 3 
page 8, Add. H). 
On May 11, 1987, September 15, 1987, October 8, 1987, 
March 21, 1988 and January 9, 1989, Architectural Specialties 
Inc. helped ASMI to meet its payroll. (R. 101 Exhibit 3 pages 
10, 11, 15 and 16, Add. H). Altogether, ASI loaned or paid in 
excess of $50,000.00 to ASMI. The payment of this money to 
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Architectural Specialties Inc. is spread from the inception of 
ASMI throughout its existence. It is clear from these facts that 
ASMI was grossly undercapitalized. 
Defendants at no time, in responding to plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment, disputed plaintiff's claim that ASMI 
was undercapitalized. In fact, a review of defendants' 
affidavits reveals that the subject of undercapitalization was 
never addressed of any of the defendants. 
C. ASMI AND ARCHITECTURAL SPECIALTIES INC. WERE 
CONDUCTED AS A JOINT VENTURE. 
The evidence presented at trial court shows that the two 
corporations, ASMI and Architectural Specialties were conducted 
on an interchangeable or joint basis as if they were one. The 
two corporations shared the same office location at 350 South 400 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 161, Add. G) . Architectural 
Specialties paid over $50,000.00 to ASMI in the form of loans or 
payment of ASMI's payroll and expenses. (R. 101 Exhibit 3, Add. 
H) . Plaintiff's invoices received by ASMI were stamped as 
received by Architectural Specialties, Inc. (R. 101 Exhibit 4, 
Add. I) . Officers of ASMI signed invoices addressed to 
Architectural Specialties, Inc. (R. 101 Exhibit 5, Add. J). 
Additionally, there was confusion by outside companies 
regarding who they were dealing with. Reynolds Metals sent in 
an invoice to defendants addressed to the following: 
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Architectural Specialties, Inc. dba Architectural S/M, 350 South 
400 East, Suite 302, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. (R. 101 Exhibit 
6, Add. K). 
ASMI had a contract for and did work on a project 
entitled Foothill Village. Materials for the Foothill Village 
project were billed and shipped to Architectural Specialties, 
Inc. (R. 101 Exhibits 17 and 18, Add. 0 and P). Architectural 
Specialties, Inc. secured and paid for insurance for ASMI on the 
Foothill Village project. (R. 101 Exhibit 19, Add. Q). 
At R. 101 Exhibits 5, 6 and 7, there are a number of 
invoices that show the confusion created in the mind of 
creditors. For example, a bill to Architectural Specialties from 
Savage Scaffolding and Equipment Company was signed by Todd 
Wheeler, who was president of ASMI. A bill on the Riverton 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Ward, which was an ASMI project, also 
with Savage Scaffolding and Equipment Company, was addressed to 
Architectural Specialties and signed by "Ray Rasmussen ASMI". 
(R. 101 Exhibit 5, Add. J). 
In addition, a bill from Swanson is addressed to 
Architectural Specialties Inc. regarding the Valley Junior High 
project, an ASMI project, and is signed by Ray Rasmussen as "Ray 
Rasmussen ASMI Pres." (R. 101 Exhibit 5, Add. J). Additional 
examples are found in the bill from PK Supply Company which is 
billed to Architectural Specialties for Precision Sheet Metal. 
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Precision was the precursor to ASMI. (R. 101 exhibit 7 page 2, 
Add. L) . A bill dated December 11# 1986, from Steel Co. is 
addressed to Architectural Specialties Inc. for the Washington 
State project and was ordered by "Ray R." (R. 101 Exhibit 7 page 
4, Add. L) . A bill from Berridge Manufacturing Company, shows 
that the materials were sold to Architectural Specialties and 
shipped to ASMI. The invoice shows that it was ordered by "Bill 
Card". (R. 101 Exhibit 7 page 7, Add. L). Another invoice from 
Steel Co. dated December 8, 1986 shows the materials being sold 
to Architectural Specialties Inc. and ordered by "Ray". (R. 101 
Exhibit 7 page 9, Add. L) . It is clear that ASMI was merely 
being used as a facade for the operations of Architectural 
Specialties Inc. and its dominant stockholders, defendants Card. 
The defendants were using ASMI as a shell to operate a particular 
aspect of their business. This factor, combined with the others, 
supports the trial court's finding that the corporate entity 
should be disregarded and the defendants held liable for the 
debts of ASMI. 
D. OBSERVANCE OF THE CORPORATE FORM WOULD SANCTION A 
FRAUD. PROMOTE INJUSTICE. OR ALLOW AN INEQUITABLE 
RESULT. 
The second prong of the alter ego test is to show that 
the observance of the corporate form would sanction a fraud, 
promote injustice, or that an inequitable result would follow. 
Norman v. Murray First Thrift and Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 
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(Utah 1979) . In this case, it is clear from the facts that ASMI 
was undercapitalized. In order to meet the corporation's debt, 
Architectural Specialties, Inc. loaned ASMI substantial amounts 
of money. (R 101 Exhibit 3, Add. H). Additionally, William C. 
Card personally loaned ASMI money. (R. 101 Exhibit 8, Add. M). 
The defendants Architectural Specialties, Inc. and William C. 
Card effectually, by their actions, chose what creditors to pay 
and what creditors not to pay. Allowing the defendants to 
operate ASMI in this manner, where the corporation was 
undercapitalized to begin with, operates as an injustice and 
fraud upon those creditors whom defendants decided, for whatever 
reason, not to pay. 
It is clear from the above that there are substantial 
undisputed facts to justify the trial court's decision to pierce 
the corporate veil and look beyond ASMI for payment of ASMI's 
debts. The only remaining issue is who is liable. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO HOLD 
ALL THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS LIABLE ON 
ASMI'S DEBT SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
Once the decision to pierce the corporate veil has been 
made, the issue is what parties should be held liable for the 
corporation's debt. Case law shows that shareholders, officers, 
and directors can be held liable. 
A. THE SHAREHOLDERS OF ASMI SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR 
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THE DEBT FOR ASMI. 
Ordinarily a corporation is regarded as a legal entity, 
separate and apart from its stockholders. However, when the 
corporate veil which protects stockholders from liability has 
been pierced, shareholders can be held personally liable. 
Dockstader v. Walker, 510 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 1973). The Alter 
Ego Doctrine is a doctrine of shareholder liability. 
Transamerica Cash Reserve v. Dixie Power. 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 
1990). Therefore, pursuant to this doctrine, the shareholders 
of ASMI should be held liable on the debt. 
It is undisputed that the shareholders of ASMI were 
Architectural Specialties, Inc., Ray Rasmussen and William L. 
Griswold. 
B. THE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS OF ASMI ARE LIABLE UNDER 
THE ALTER EGO DOCTRINE. 
While typical application of the alter ego doctrine 
involves a controlling shareholder, "under circumstances 
indicting that the corporation is only the "alter ego" of an 
officer or director, he may be held individually liable for the 
acts of the corporation." 18B. Am. Jur. 2d Corporations Section 
1829. 
The 'alter ego1 theory as well as other theories that 
courts resort to that justify disregard of the corporate 
entity and holding corporate officers or directors 
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personally liable for acts of the corporation are the 
same general principles applied in determining whether 
the corporate entity will be disregarded so as to hold 
a majority or controlling stockholder (Individual or 
corporate) responsible. 18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations 
Section 1829 n.60. 
The United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia 
Circuit, reiterated this position in Labadie Coal Company v. 
Black, 672 F. 2d 92 (1982) . The court indicated that while in 
many instances the person "controlling" a close corporation is 
also the sole, or at least a dominant, shareholder, in other 
cases the controlling person or persons may seek to avoid 
personal liability by not formally becoming a shareholder in the 
corporation. The court indicated that the question is one of 
control, not merely paper ownership. As such, an officer or 
director, such as William C. Card or William Lane Card, who does 
not formally own shares in the corporation because he owns it 
through another corporation that is the dominate stockholder, 
can still be held liable. The Court of Appeals in North Carolina 
in Rose's Stores, Inc. v. Padgett, 303 S.E. 2d 344 (N.C. App. 
1983) agreed with this line of reasoning when it indicated that 
although the defendants were not the sole stockholders during the 
activity alleged in the complaint, it was sufficient to raise the 
inference that the two individuals were in control of the 
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corporation, although not stockholders. Id. at 348. 
The fact that the Cards did not own stock in ASMI does 
not affect the circuit courtfs ruling. The absence of stock 
ownership is not dispositive. See Sage Ridge Holding Company. 
Inc. v. U.S. , 880 F. 2d 342 (11th Cir. 1989) . Also see Krivo 
Industrial Supply Co. v. International Distillers and Chemical 
Corp. , 483 F.2d 1098, 1104 (5th Cir. 1973) (absence of stock 
ownership in corporation does not preclude application of the 
instrumentality rule where action and control has been otherwise 
established). 
Based on the above case law and the undisputed facts set 
forth in the statement of facts, the Circuit Court's holding that 
the defendants Card were liable, despite not being shareholders, 
is proper. The Circuit Court's decision should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
The Circuit Court Summary Judgment holding each of the 
defendants liable for ASMI's debts should be upheld for the 
following reasons: 
1. There is no dispute regarding the fact that ASMI is 
liable in the full principal amount, attorney's fees, and 
interest as awarded by the Circuit Court judge. 
2. Looking at only the undisputed facts alleged by 
plaintiff, supported in plaintiff's memorandum and attached 
exhibits, and not specifically disputed by defendants, the 
23 
Circuit Court's decision to pierce the corporate veil is proper 
because defendants did not observe proper corporate formalities, 
ASMI was grossly undercapitalized, and ASMI and Architectural 
Specialties were operated as a joint venture. 
3. Each of the defendants, as either shareholders or 
officers and directors, should be held liable based on their 
participation in ASMI and on case law holding shareholders, 
officers, and directors liable. 
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